For those of you out there who like to gleefully smirk about “strategy”; let me explain it immediately here at the start (and hopefully once and for all): Strategy is a necessary condition for success. But it is not a sufficient condition – we (strategy professors) are not that stupid.
I’ll explain in a sec exactly what we mean by that – a necessary but not sufficient condition – but let me first explain the gleeful smirk.
I again saw it last November, when the Monitor Group went bankrupt. The Monitor Group was a strategy consulting firm founded by Harvard Business School’s Michael Porter; seen by many as the founding father of the field of business strategy.
When it went bankrupt I was gleefully approached by various people in various corridors making gleeful remarks that this strategy consultant’s strategy could not even save itself, and the famous strategy guru Michael Porter couldn’t even put together a company that made enough money to pay the rent. With the underlying ergo: see, this strategy stuff does not really work.
Let me now move on to the necessary but not sufficient condition thing: When a company has a good strategy – even a great strategy – it can still fail. Yes, fail. It can still fail because to be a success in business you need lots of other things besides a good strategy: you still need to be able to get the technology you envisioned, to motivate your people, forge and nurture customer relations, get the right financing, and so on and so on. There are lots of other things you need to be good at, in addition to strategy, before your company will become a success. You can have an excellent strategy in mind but if you mess up in these other areas you will go down nonetheless.
Hence, having a good strategy is not sufficient to becoming a success.
But it is a necessary condition. What we mean by that is that even if you’re good at absolutely everything – developing technology, motivate your people, forge and nurture customer relations, and get the right financing – but your strategy sucks, in terms of what you are actually trying to accomplish in the market place, you will be (to use a good English expression) flogging a dead horse.
You can flog all you want, but without the right strategy it is all wasted energy and other resources; it ain’t going to work. The beast isn’t going to jump up and run.
I have seen various CEOs who were really great business leaders, in the sense that they were charismatic, structured, genuine people-managers, politically astute, and so on, but who were trying to build a company on what was basically a flawed idea: a strategy that was never going to work. They were still great CEOs – nobody can be good at everything – but without a great strategy no CEO can build a great company. In which case you’re better off outsourcing your strategy development to someone else; even if that someone else is the Monitor Group or Michael Porter.
I like strategy, and I think it is really important. But I am not daft enough to think that all you need is a good strategy and all will be well. But at least your horse will be running.
Friday, 12 April 2013
Strategy is Necessary but not Sufficient
COMMENTS 12.4.13
Wednesday, 27 February 2013
Fraud or apathy: What is academia’s biggest threat?
Diederik Stapel committed a truly massive fraud. And he wasn’t even very good at it. As we know now, he completely made up the data of many – and probably most – of his (very prominent) academic publications.
I have written about him before, because obviously he forms both a fascinating and worrying case. It is worrying not because it makes me suspect there are probably more of such massive fraud cases that currently remain undetected – his fraud was so huge that I have trouble imagining – perhaps naively – that it is not unique. However, I have much less trouble imagining that for every case like Stapel’s, there are probably many more of much smaller fraud, which could easily add up to something even bigger.
Stapel made up all his data regarding pretty much all his publications – and got away with it for a long time. How many people might there be out there who make up only parts of their data for some of their publications…?
It is like cases of insider trading, or rogue investment bank traders; the cases that come out in the open are often colossal cases of fraud (although there is a bit of attention bias), involving billions of pounds, not seldom committed in a rather clumsy way. For every immense, clumsy case of insider trading, how many smaller, more sophisticated villains might there be…?
But there is another reaction to the Stapel fraud that makes me worried. Newspapers that reported on and described his fraud often gave examples of his experiments. For example, he would predict and “find” that people exposed to the world “capitalism” in an experiment would be less inclined to share their M&Ms with others and, instead, selfishly stuff them into their own drooling mouths.
On newspaper websites, people would comment on these articles, and their reactions were remarkably consistent; they never said “tsss, he committed fraud with something as important like that…” (a reaction I imagine they would have had had it concerned a clinical trial of a new cancer drug); invariably, their reaction would be “that’s what these scientists spend our tax money on?! silly things like that!?” and “that’s the kind of stuff that makes someone a famous professor?!”
People seem to not care at all that he made up his data because, to them, it concerned stuff they find completely trivial, irrelevant and infantile. They are not outraged by his fraud; they couldn’t care less.
Now, I am not saying I completely agree with them (I would find it interesting – and potentially even important – if putting people in a capitalist frame of mind would automatically make them act more selfishly) but I am wondering whether apathy and an active disinterest might not be even more threatening to the long-term prospects of social psychology as a field than fraud. To the general audience, their research appears trivial and unimportant.
Stapel has now written a book – I guess largely because he simply needs the money, now that his career prospects in academia have been truncated – detailing his descent into fraud. Perhaps in his next book he can tell us – and the world at large – why his experiments would have been important and worth doing (for real). And hence why people should be outraged by his fraud, because currently, they’re not.
COMMENTS 27.2.13
Friday, 11 January 2013
Do Firms Trust Universities?
Earlier this week, I attended a seminar at the London Business School by Michaël Bikard – a PhD candidate at MIT – who presented his research on technological inventions. Such inventions are, of course, often patented. Examining these patents allowed Michaël to determine on which technological breakthrough discoveries these inventions were based. Hence, these inventions are basically commercial applications of the more fundamental discoveries.
Fairly regularly, a university or a firm builds on and commercializes its own discoveries but, quite often, such an organisation may also be building on the discoveries of others. That is possible because such fundamental discoveries will often be published, in academic journals such as Nature or Science, and hence are accessible to everyone. And that’s when it gets interesting; because on whose discoveries are firms more likely to build when working on applied inventions: on the discoveries of universities or of other companies?
It matters where a discovery was made
Past research on the topic has basically been comparing apples and oranges, because the discoveries coming out of universities are often fundamentally different from the breakthroughs achieved in firms. Michaël, however, wanted to know whether it mattered to companies where the breakthrough had taken place – regardless of the actual content of the breakthrough. Therefore, he analysed a unique yet fascinating set of technological discoveries, namely the instances where the exact same breakthrough happened at the exact same time in a university and in a firm.
This happens surprisingly often. For example, in the winter of 1999, two teams of scientists simultaneously discovered VR1 (vanilloid receptor1), the receptor for the pain caused by excessive heat. The first team of scientists – who published the finding in Science in May 2000 – was from the University of California in San Francisco. The second team, however, worked at SmithKline Beecham. Hence, the same idea originated simultaneously in a university and in a firm. In total, there were 39 of such simultaneous discoveries in firms and universities between 1970 and 2009.
Then, through patent analysis, Michaël tracked all commercial inventions that built on one of the 39 fundamental discoveries, such as VR1. And he found out that the patenting companies much more often had picked up on the discovery from the publication by the firms. Now, note that these companies could have picked up on the exact same idea from the publication by the universities, but they didn’t – apparently companies scanning for fundamental knowledge pay more attention to the discoveries of other firms. In comparison, they don’t bother with stuff coming out of universities. And that begs the question: why?
Firms do not monitor universities
Why do firms not pay attention to the discoveries by universities? It’s not about the content of the discovery; that, in this case, is the exact same thing. To find out, Michaël started interviewing people; the R&D folk that had worked on the commercial inventions.
And they confirmed that they basically did not bother much looking at the stuff coming out of universities. The first reason is because that is simply what companies are used to doing: indeed, most firms I know obsessively monitor their competitors, so if such a competitor comes up with a new discovery, they will notice. They don’t habitually look at universities. Therefore, they miss stuff. And that’s their loss.
The second reason is more worrying (at least, to me, as an academic): The interviewees proclaimed that they don’t pay much attention to the publications about fundamental discoveries by universities because they don’t trust them. Some feel that academics are too heavily incentivised and put under pressure to publish stuff; i.e. the infamous “publish or perish” culture. This, in their view, increases the chance that the publications are dubious, flawed, or outright fraudulent. And they’re not taking any chances with them.
One inventor proclaimed: “It’s a much higher bar [for industry], higher standards, because every error, or every piece of fraud along the way, the end game is going to fail. … Therefore, I have more faith in what industry puts out there as a publication”. Firms don’t pay attention to published discoveries by universities because they think chances are that it is bogus.
I remember that the company MORI used to run surveys on “who do you trust?” – and they probably still do – dividing, among others, the results by profession. Ten years ago, priests and professors used to come out on top; businessmen and politicians near the bottom. I don’t know exactly what people nowadays think of the trustworthiness of businessmen and politicians, but I have a fair idea what happened to the faith in priests and professors.
COMMENTS 11.1.13
Thursday, 13 December 2012
Which Best Practice Is Ruining Your Business?
For many decades,
newspapers were big; printed on the so-called broadsheet format. However, it
was not cheaper to print on such large sheets of paper – that was not the reason for their
exorbitant size – in fact, it was more expensive, in comparison to the
so-called tabloid size. So why did newspaper companies insist on printing the
news on such impractical, large sheets of paper? Why not print it on smaller
paper? Newspaper companies, en masse, assumed that “customers would not want it”;
“quality newspapers are broadsheet”.
When finally, in 2004,
the United Kingdom’s Independent switched to the denounced tabloid size, it saw
its circulation surge. Other newspapers in the UK and other countries followed
suit, boosting their circulation too. Customers did want it; the newspaper
companies had been wrong in their assumptions.
When I looked into
where the practice had come from – to print newspapers on impractically large
sheets of paper – it appeared its roots lay in England. In 1712, the English
government started taxing newspapers based on the number of pages that they
printed. In response, companies made their newspapers big, so that they could
print them on fewer pages. Although this tax was abolished in 1855, companies
everywhere continued to print on the impractical large sheets of paper. They
had grown so accustomed to the size of their product that they thought it could
not be done any other way. But they were wrong. In fact, the practice had been
holding their business back for many years.
COMMENTS 13.12.12
Monday, 15 October 2012
Should Business Schools Be Braver?
About a year ago, a journalist asked me: “The current crisis; you could see it as the failure of corporate governance in general, and boards of directors in specific. What radical new ideas do we see coming out of business schools in terms of how we could organise governance and boards better?”
I answered him what I thought was the truth: “Ehm…. not much really”.
Last week, I was in Prague, for the Annual Meeting of the Strategic Management Society; a bunch of business school professors talking about their research. I attended a session which featured a panel of five senior professors who specialise in governance and boards. I couldn’t resist asking them the same question as the journalist had posed to me: “What radical new ideas do you have in terms of how we could perhaps organise governance and boards better?”
Their answer was basically the same as mine, with equal levels of eloquence: “Ehm… not much really”.
In fact, after a slightly stunned silence, one professor replied to me: “What do you think?” (the reply every professor gives to a student when s/he does not have an answer available), where the second one answered “boards is not really where the action is”. And that was that.
Somehow, I have to admit, I did not expect a real answer – just as I did not have one. And that is because business school professors seldom have an opinion. We are all trained – in our research, through rigorous PhD programmes and years of socialization – to not make assertions but to only make claims that are thoroughly proven, by solid empirics and rigorous theory. And I applaud and adhere to that; I like evidence. However, at some point, you need to take that evidence and develop an opinion. And that’s where it usually stalls, in business schools.
Because people are not used to say anything without evidence, they end up saying nothing at all. That’s because when it comes to questions such as “how could we organise this better?” the evidence is always going to be imperfect.
It reminded me of what a paediatric neurologist once told me: “What I do is part art; part science. I know all the scientific evidence and treatments and medication, but at the end of the day, every child and case is unique, and you have to make a choice and an develop an opinion”.
In business schools, we’re more likely to let the child die. Since we have no perfect evidence on what the exact treatment should be, we end up doing nothing.
Hence, that the five professors did not express an opinion did not really surprise me. But what I later realised, and what did surprise me – although I blame myself for my naivety – is that not only are you not expected to have an opinion; you’re not even supposed to want to have one.
Even raising the question and asking for an opinion is considered suspect, illegitimate and un-academic. As business school academics, we describe and seek to understand reality, but are not supposed to want to alter and improve it. Which is a shame, because sometimes I feel the world of business – and the world in general – could do with a bit of improvement.
“I know what I want, I have a goal, an opinion. If God lets me live, I shall not remain insignificant, I shall work in the world and for mankind! And now I know that first and foremost I shall require courage and cheerfulness!” Anne Frank, April 11, 1944
COMMENTS 15.10.12
Friday, 5 October 2012
Steve Jobs – Perhaps Apple Could Have Done Without Him
“Steve Jobs – the man was fallible” is what I wrote in October 2011. I guess it seems pretty innocent now – although there may some remnants of people who still feel offended by it – but, believe it or not, one year ago it actually triggered a small barrage of hate mail.
Since then, I have read or heard others describe him as a terrorist, an asshole, and a psychopath (which, given that many US presidents have been shown to have had psychopathic tendencies may not even be unlikely). Hey, all I said was that he was “fallible”!
But all these people, in the wake of calling him a terrorist, an asshole, or a psychopath, without exception, also described him as a genius. And a person who built the greatest company on earth, changing all of our daily lives in the process.
But, in fact, I am not so sure of that either…
I don’t mean this as some lame attempt at a final insult – suggesting that he wasn’t even responsible for building this great company – but as a genuine question: Would Apple have been equally great today if it hadn’t been for Steve Jobs? And, honestly, I think that is not impossible. And that is because I am a Tolstoy fan.
Tolstoy, in War and Peace, using Napoleon as an example, had a very clear opinion of leadership. A leader “is just a banner, they hold aloft in the wind”. “Napoleon thinks he commands a 100,000 men, but in reality, he follows them”. Tolstoy thought that what drove the French into Russia was not the act of a single man – Napoleon – but the result of much greater, collective human forces. Those forces needed a spearhead, and that became Napoleon. But if it hadn’t been him, someone else would have emerged to follow those forces as their leader. Because “The course of earthly happenings … depends on the combined volition of all who participate in those events, and … the influence of a Napoleon on the course of those events is purely superficial and imaginary”.
Would Apple have become great without Steve Jobs, or would someone else have surfaced to spearhead and personify the combined volition of the people working in that area in that company at that point time? I think the answer might be yes.
But who knows? And I know I will never know. But I also know that pretty much every person who reads this piece thinks he or she knows that the answer is “no”. “No, Apple would never have been this great without Steve Jobs”. And nothing will ever change that. Because what Steve Jobs has going on Napoleon, is that he is dead. Or better, that he died before Apple’s demise. Napoleon lived to see his armies defeated by the Russians, and by the forces commanded by the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo. People started to realize he wasn’t such a superhuman genius as they once thought he was.
When Apple’s performance will start to plunge (and I mean “when” and not “if”) the Great Man Steve will not be there to blame.
And of course Apple will, one day, start to underperform. One day, it will be outcompeted by its rivals, and even lose their shareholders’ money in the process (if alone for the simple reason that if it continues its current growth rate for another decade it will be more valuable than the rest of planet Earth combined, eyeing up dominance of the solar system next). It will fall. But then people will simply say that it wouldn’t have happened had Steve Jobs still been around. Because he’s their banner; their banner they hold aloft in the wind.
COMMENTS 5.10.12
Tuesday, 28 August 2012
What’s an Academic Fraud?
I recently discovered I am an academic fraud. Now, I am sure there must be people out there whose immediate response is “of course you are”, “knew it” or “I am not surprised”, but I was.
Admittedly, what amounts to fraud when publishing as an academic isn’t always entirely clear to me – which, to some, is enough to be suspect (if not guilty-till-proven-innocent) already. I do get the extremes; I’m not that daft: If one writes up a truly new academic study giving the full account of the research underlying it, it ain’t fraud. If you make up the data – emulating the now infamous Diederik Stapel – it is. But sometimes in between, I am not always sure… Let me give you a few potential examples.
• Last month, at the Editorial Board Meeting of the Academy of Management Journal, the editor reported that the journal would now start screening every submitted article for plagiarism. The software turns up whether parts of the text have been copied from earlier publications, including articles by the same author (in a case of self-plagiarism). After this, a fellow board member asked “can we access the same software to pre-screen our own articles before submitting them?” There wasn’t a murmur or hint of discontent in the room following this question, but I found it strange and uneasy. If you copy a piece of text, then pre-screen it and the software tells you you would be found out, you rewrite it a bit plugging in a few synonyms here and there and then it is ok and no longer considered fraud and plagiarism?!
• Geert Hofstede, one of the most highly cited social scientists ever (citations are considered a signal of “impact” in our academic world, and I seem to remember him once telling me that he had more citations than Karl Marx…), became famous for developing dimensions of national cultural differences. He published these dimensions left-right-and-centre – in academic journals, magazines and books – which greatly contributed to their and his exposure. He nowadays would be covered in tar and feathers and chased out of the ivory tower for self-plagiarism?
• Situation A: PhD student A copies a paragraph leading up to one of his hypotheses from a working paper by someone else he found on the web, without citation. Situation B: PhD student B copies a summary of a previously published academic article from a third, published paper who summarised the same article. Situation C: likewise, but with a citation to that third article, but no quotation marks. Situation D: likewise, but with citation and quotation marks. Who should get kicked out of the programme? At London Business School we have already dealt with situations A and B (the students were chased out), and D of course, but I am left wondering what we’d do in situation C.
• An academic – and an obvious fan of the Matthew Effect – buys 20,000 followers on Twitter. Yes, if you didn’t know, buying (fake) twitter followers is possible and easy. In fact, yesterday, I learned it is as cheap as chips. Yesterday, the Sunday Times covered the tale of an aspiring English celebrity who bought about 20,000 followers on Twitter to boost her profile. It just cost her a few hundred pounds/dollars. And, in fact, it sort of worked; she did raise her profile. But when she was found out – which isn’t actually that easy – she was ridiculed and quickly chased back to the dubious and crowded ranks of the British B-celebrities. But what would we do? How would we react to an academic buying 20,000 “followers”? Tar and feathers or applause for bringing the Matthew Effect to practice?
I am – apparently – a shameless self-plagiarising fraud because I sometimes get approached by business magazines who say “we read your blog post X and would like to republish it in our magazine”. And if they’re half decent (even by business magazine standards), I tend to say “yes”… In fact, I sometimes make the suggestion myself; when some magazine asks me “would you like to write an article on X for our wonderful magazine?” I usually say “no (way), but chapter X from my book would suit you well. Feel free to republish that”. Some acknowledge it was previously published; some don’t.
And, frankly, I don’t really care, and I will probably do it again. If it is my work, my copy-right, the magazine is fully aware of it, and it doesn’t harm the reader (they will know if they’ve seen it before, and otherwise they probably didn’t, or they might suffer from an enviable dose of business magazine amnesia), I won’t fear or dodge the tar and feathers. In fact, who knows, you may have read this very same post before!
COMMENTS 28.8.12
Tuesday, 17 July 2012
The Reality of Strategy: The Case of London Business School
When Laura d’Andrea Tyson was the Dean of London Business School – some years ago – she put together a committee to examine and reformulate the School’s strategy. Several professors sat on that committee. When I once asked her, having a drink at her home, why none of them were Strategy professors, she looked at me for about 5 seconds baffled. Eventually, she stammered, “yes, perhaps we could consider that in the future….”.
It was clear to me, from her stunned silence (and she wasn’t easily lost for words), that she had never even considered the thought before.
I, in contrast, thought it wasn’t such an alien idea; putting some strategy professors on the School’s strategy-making committee. We had – and still have – people in our Strategy department (e.g. Costas Markides, Sumantra Ghoshal) who not only had dozens of top academic publications behind their names but who also had an eager ear amongst strategy practitioners, through their Harvard Business Review publications and hundreds of thousands of business books sold (not to mention their fairly astronomical consulting fees).
Today, our current Dean – Sir Andrew Likierman – is working with a group of people on a huge strategic growth decision for the School, namely the acquisition of a nearby building from the local government that would increase our capacity overnight with about 70 percent. Once more, strategy professors have no closer role in the process than others; their voice is as lost in the quackmire as anyone else’s.
If Sir Andrew had been an executive MBA student in my elective (“Strategies for Growth”) writing an essay about the situation, I would ask him for a justification of the need for growth given the characteristics of the market; I’d ask him about the various options for growth (geographic expansion, e.g. a campus abroad; related diversification, e.g. on-line space, etc.), and how an analysis of the organisation’s resources and capabilities is linked to these various options, and so on. But a systematic analysis based on what we teach in our own classrooms and publish in our books and journals has, it seems, not even be considered.
And I genuinely wonder why that is? Because it is not only strategy professors and it is not only deans. Whenever the topic of the School’s brand name comes up, no-one seems inclined to pay more attention to our Marketing professors (some of whom are true heavyweights in the field branding) than to the layman’s remarks of Economics or Strategy folk. When the School’s culture and values are being assessed, Organizational Behaviour professors are conspicuously absent from the organising committee (ironically it was run by a Marketing guy); likewise for Economics and OB professors when we are discussing incentives and remuneration. So why is that?
Is it that deep down we don’t actually believe what we teach? Or is it that we just don’t believe what any of our colleagues in other departments teach…? And that it could be somehow relevant to practice – including our own? Why do we charge companies and students small – and not so small – fortunes to take our guidance on how to make strategy, brands, and remuneration systems only to see that when our own organisation is dealing with them it all goes out the door?
I guess I simply don’t understand the psychology behind this. Wait… perhaps I should go ask my Organizational Behaviour professors down the corridor!
**********************
ADDENDUM
Since writing the piece above – perhaps not surprisingly; although it took me a bit by surprise (I didn’t think anyone actually read that stuff) – Sir Andrew contacted me. One could say that he took the oral exam following his essay on the School’s growth plans and passed it (with a distinction!)
In all seriousness, in hindsight, I think I was unfair to him – perhaps even presumptuous. I wrote “a systematic analysis based on what we teach in our own classrooms and publish in our books and journals has, it seems, not even be considered” and, now, I think I should not have written this. That I haven’t been involved in the process much and therefore have not seen the analysis of course does not mean it was never conducted. And it is a bit unfair, from the sidelines, to throw in a comment like that when someone has put in so much careful work. I apologise!
In fact, although Sir Andrew never lost his British cool, charme and good sense of humour, I realise it must actually have been “ever so slightly annoying” for him to read that comment, especially from a colleague, and he doesn’t deserve that. So: regarding the specifics of this example: forget it! ban it from your minds, memory, bookmarks and favourites (how would this Vermeulen guy know?! he wasn’t even there!)!
That you should pay more attention to Marketing professors when considering your school’s brandname, more attention to your OB professors when considering your incentive systems and values, more attention to Finance professors when managing your endownment and, God forbid, sometimes even to some strategy professors when considering your school’s strategy, I feel, does stand – so don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater just yet. But, yes, do get rid of that stinky bathwater.
COMMENTS 17.7.12